Analysis of ancient sediments and extra-terrestrial materials Semiannual report, 1 Jun. - 30 Nov. 1966

Isolation and identification of organic components of meteorites, and ancient sediment

Nature and changes in organic matter in organic sediments

A series of isoprenoid compounds were isolated from a heat treated marine sediment (from Tanner Basin) which were not present in the original sediment. Among the compounds identified were: phytol, dihydrophytol, C-18-isoprenoid ketone, phytanic and pristanic acids, C-19- and C-10-monoolefines, and the alkanes pristane and phytane. The significance and possible routes leading to these compounds is discussed

Communication of Preferences in Contests for Contracts

This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are unable to change their style, then there is no effect on the welfare of the sellers. If the sellers are able to make adjustments, extra information may either boost or damage the sellers' profits. While the chance that there will be a proposal of a style preferred by the buyer cannot decrease, the buyer's surplus may increase or decrease.Contests, Procurement, Communication

Some effects of y-axis vibration on visual acuity Final report, Jul. 1966 - Nov. 1967

Side to side head vibration effects on visual acuity measurement

The Isotopic Abundance and Content of Sulfur in Meteorites

Isotopic abundance and content of sulfur in stony and iron meteorite

A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions

We formulate a way to study whether the asymmetry of buyers (in the sense of having different prior probability distributions of valuations) is helpful to the seller in private-value auctions (asked first by Cantillon [2001]). In our proposed formulation, this question corresponds to two important questions previously asked: Does a first-price auction have higher revenue than a second-price auction when buyers have asymmetric distributions (asked by Maskin and Riley[2000])? And does a seller enhance revenue by releasing information (asked by Milgrom and Weber[1982])? This is shown by constructing two Harsanyi games of incomplete information each having the same ex-ante distribution of valuations but in one beliefs are symmetric while in the other beliefs are sometimes asymmetric. Our main result is that answers to all three questions coincide when values are independent and are related when values are affiliated.Asymmetric Auctions; Asymmetric Beliefs; Affiliation; Linkage Principle

Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions

Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (2006) prove that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of �rst-price auctions is unique. This uniqueness requires the assumption that a buyer never bids above his value. We demonstrate that, in asymmetric �rst-price auctions (with or without a minimum bid), the relaxation of this assumption results in additional equilibria that are "substantial." Although in each of these additional equilibria no buyer wins with a bids above his value, the allocation of the object and the selling price may vary among the equilibria. Furthermore, we show that such phenomena can only occur under asymmetry in the distributions of values.Asymmetric auctions, �first-price auctions, multiple equilibria

Using Economic Classroom Experiments

Economic classroom experiments are an excellent way to increase student interest, but getting started may be difficult. We attempt to aid the newcomer by recommending which experiments to use and describing the current resources available.

Effective Political Contests

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be ineffective, namely, the chance of low ability candidates participating in the contest might be higher than the chance of high ability candidates participating in the contest (and winning). However, by imposing a costly requirement (fee) on the winner of the contest, one can guarantee that the contest will be effective.All-pay auctions, Contests, Entry costs